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Abstract 
The relation between history and the history of philosophy implies to constitute a signifying universe that exceeds its own 
historical causality, an aspect which represents a destruction of history, either regarding the comprehension of the absolute 
system, or that of the absolute singularity. It is precisely this complex of a scholastic historical tradition that must be 
destroyed in order to avoid the captivity of the history of philosophy in a situation without issue. This is because of the fact 
that no significant answer corresponds to a proposal of a universal meaning of the question. If the level of historicity founds 
historiography from an existential point of view, beyond its structural dimension, it makes the philosophical works of the past 
able to respond to the questions of the present, according to their eventful essence. The fusion of history and philosophical 
questions regards the great hermeneutical task of the comprehension proper to the history of philosophy: the possibility of 
questioning and that of signifying. 
 
© 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Claudiu Mesaros (West University of 
Timisoara, Romania) 
Keywords: History of philosophy; tradition; hermeneutical distance; existential comprehension; historical truth; destruction; reader. 
1. Introduction 
he pure 
understanding. Therefore, on one hand, being a part of the 
global spiritual life, philosophy contributes to the effort of ordering the values according to a certain hierarchy. 
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it is neither the philosophy in general, on the whole of its development, nor the psychological 
evolution of every philosopher in particular that forms the immediate object of the history of philosophy, but the 
doctrines conceived by  [1]. It is an aspect that implies, first of all, a historical observation of the 
but only question within the proper significance of its historicity. Secondly, he must analyze  try to explain a 
thought of the past  and this explanation is a philosophical one. To explain philosophy through philosophy does 
not  thus straight relations 
of assistance and kinship between the history of philosophy and philosophy itself. And one could estimate 
without doubt that, even for the philosophical research, the history of philosophy is a precious and even 
indispensable auxil  [2]. Consequently, 
time with  [3]. It requires the understanding of the history of philosophy as a 
philosophical problem: that means, on one hand, that the philosophical object does not exist other than 
historicizing itself, not going to the historical fact, but trying to show its constitution [4]; on the other hand, it 
means to do the history of lasting problems, problems creating their own duration.  
The problem presented briefly above will be developed according to three main dimensions, as many as the 
difficulties that may cause an attempt on the status of the history of philosophy as an independent discipline, and 
finally, in a concluding section, we shall try to offer a possible way to avoid these aporetic stages. 
2. The unstable status of the history of philosophy balancing between its philosophical and historical tasks 
One of the main obstacles which must be overcome is the temptation of coincidence and of restoration, the 
more an   [1]. 
reproduce throug
reflected in his doctrine, that is no doubt what one must do;   however it is not enough to restore a philosophical 
doctrine, fact that would mean  as Delbos says  n and of a passive 
 [2]. 
 pretence of understanding it 
 [2].  This aspect involves a reflection on the comprehension in the history of philosophy, comprehension 
directed neither towards the subjectivity of the authors nor towards the evolution integrated in a system, 
according to an intentional comprehension. The only matter that counts is the intention of the text itself, the 
spiritual profile of the doctrine itself: the meaning of a work according to its interior coherence, the historical 
emergence of a singular and original spirituality. For the historian of philosophy abandons the eternal problems, 
in favor of approaching in detail the texts of the interpretative traditions, his task being to return to the data of the 
text. The text does not exist as a transcendent reference or as an ideal state; being itself a historical product, the 
 [4]. 
well and to understand well the doctrines, to explain them, as far as one is capable of, as the author would do it 
task, that one to which all t  [1]. We have mentioned here several stages of the 
hermeneutical way of understanding the history of philosophy: explanation, comprehension, interpretative 
knowledge and, above all  or rather piercing through them , an intimate identification with the spirit of the 
author, with his living thoughts, and not a psychological assimilation which intends to create a unique horizon, as 
V. Cousin believes when he says that the 
hi  [5]. philosophies are living thoughts. It is only by seeking 
in the book the way to revive these thoughts in oneself that o  [1].  
In this case both the historian and the author are philosophers; each time the historian presents, explains and 
understands a theory or a certain doctrine he tries to abandon his own philosophy, if he has one, his own beliefs 
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and experiences, in order to penetrate better in a foreign world. What he is gaining at the level of methodological 
extroversion  by a sort of phenomenological reduction, putting himself in parentheses  is lost at the level of 
preferable: an impersonal historian without philosophy who explains neither his philosophy nor that of a specific 
and repeatable truth, or a historian who understands the history of philosophy through his own philosophy and 
personal truth? It is obvious that, in the first case, the history of philosophy is subordinated to a method which 
tries each time to reveal a way of objectivity close to that proposed by the sciences of nature; in the second case, 
we have an interpretative discourse which claims to discover everywhere the manifestations of a subjective yet 
universal truth, the history of philoso  taking itself into 
 argues É. Bréhier in his Introduction entitled Les 
toire de la Philosophie   is the existence of a kind of historical a priori, which consists in the 
 
not oppose itself any more to the present; it is conditioning it and, justified by it, it is only unrolling the unity of a 
systematic and preconceived plan. Every history of philosophy till our days is founded on a discussion of this 
 [6]. As we shall see, both ways must be avoided, be the history of 
philosophy must not ignore the philosophical spirit which begot the doctrines keeping between them in more or 
less severe forms of a certain kinship, it must neither proceed through more or less a priori reconstructions, either 
concerning the significance and the internal development of  [2].  
3. The problem of the authority of the tradition and the hermeneutical distance 
ate the text  every kind of text: literary or philosophical  
as the paradigm of distance in communication, problem that situates it in the very centre of the historicity of 
human experience. In the historical sphere, just the conscience to be carried by traditions that precede us makes 
possible the use of a historical methodology at the level of the history of philosophy. The historical conscience of 
nt of 
depa  [7], that is the point of view from which the comprehensive perspective opens itself. Yet an 
ambiguous place, because, on the one hand, it is a place of reflection and, on the other hand, a place of existence, 
a place of the present where the past is invited to enter. But the traditionalized past is already given, delivered to 
the historical conscience which tries to appropriate it in reflection. It is as if we wanted to bring before us 
something that is happening behind us. The fact that the historian of the philosophy projects his own judgment on 
texts marked (or masked) by the authority of the tradition only confers him the modest role of commentator of 
some consecrated values, as an attester of their post mortem validity and not that of a witness of their living 
reality always a factor of liberty and of history itself. Even the more authentic, solid tradition does not 
accomplish in a natural way, owing to the persistence of what already exists, but it needs an affirmation, an 
assumption and a cultivation. It is, essentially, a preservation (Bewahrung) that participates in the entire historical 
 [8]. To preserve in the present something from the past means to make the traditionalized value 
participate actively at the liberty of the present, to make it implied in a reflection without tradition and perhaps 
without the dogmatic authority given by the timeless classicization. Here is the point where we are confronting 
ourselves with the opposition between the alienating distance (Verfremdung) that is supporting the objective 
approach of the human sciences and the primordial relation of belonging (Zugehörigkeit) to the historical element 
as such. It is in fact a conflict between the method and the truth: on one hand, the distance makes possible the 
objectification, conferring a scientific, methodological, statute; on the other hand, it ruins the fundamental 
relation with the truth it belongs to, that is with a historical reality we are participating in. A problem that seems 
to set an impossible alternative: either the methodological attitude, situation in which we gain in objectivity, but 
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or the attitude related to the truth, case in which we gain the 
reality of existence, but we lose the scientific objectivity.  
The fact that, through the text, the interpreter communicates a historical experience  and this is a 
communication in and through distance  
 [7]. It is about the textual productivity through and in which the human 
experience is recreated. But it recreates itself as distance in relation with the concrete historicity to which man 
belongs. A distance that, as we shall see, is no more alienating, forcing a submission to the rules of a foreign 
world, but a communicating, dialogical and inter- hical ideas, if they 
adhere in a certain way to individuals and to contingent circumstances, they adhere in other ways to the human 
spirit  [2]. -in 
(Darinstehen) is not an objectifying attitude through which the message of the tradition is thought of as 
something strange. This one already belongs to us, permanently; it is a model to follow or to deny, a self 
recognition regarding which historical ulterior judgment on the past will not be a real cognition, but simply the 
most free  [8]. That is why, at the beginning of every hermeneutical historiography 
applied to philosophy, we must reject the epistemological methodology that dominates the theory of knowledge 
and ask ourselves if the comprehension proper to human sciences  that is also to the history of philosophy  
correctly understood when it moves the totality of its own historicity in the sphere of prejudgments that must be 
eli  and if it is not more appropriate to understand the philosophy of the past in its historical evolution as 
it speaks for the present, as it may present itself to the contemporary thought, approach in which the 
comprehension and the duration of the in tradition an 
 [8]. Therefore  so as A. de Libera underlines  because the history of philosophy is 
history of  the historian places himself 
the intention of the one who put forward the problem and th  [4].     
The problem of the hermeneutical situation implied by this fundamental fact is not a simple one. And this is 
main the history of philosophy cannot be, if it wants to be faithful, the abstract history of ideas and of 
systems, separated from the intentions of their authors, and from the moral and social atmosphere in which they 
t difficulties that may be opposed to the idea of an abstract history of the systems is 
the fact that may be called the transfer of the level of doctrines  [6], for example the polemics on the limits of the 
domains of faith and reason. In order to illustrate this transfer, to correct some optic illusions and to reduce the 
distance that separates historiographical sketches from reality in its complexity, E. Gilson for instance, in his 
Preface to The Philosophy of the Middle Ages, places all the events in the large context of a history of 
intellectual culture in the Middle Ages, trying  as he says   [9]; from the main moments he 
retains only what can explain its general meaning. Therefore, the division in centuries and series of authors is 
only a simple frame. Despite the effort to follow closely the concrete, he admits that all history of the medieval 
philosophy supposes the decision to abstract this philosophy from the theological medium in which it appeared 
and from which it cannot be separated without violating the historical reality. So he does not admit any severe 
demarcation line between the history of philosophy and the history of theology, and that is because there is 
nothing more legitimate, from the point of view of the general history of philosophy, than to ask oneself how the 
philosophical problems of the Greeks have evolved during the first fourteen centuries of the Christian era. 
Another example is that of H. Corbin, who raises almost the same methodological problems in the Foreword of 
his History of the Islamic Philosophy. He states that in order to suggest a general orientation, able to understand 
neither limited to the traditional diagram present in the hand-books of the  
as in the West since medieval Scholasticism  from theology, where the history of philosophy as well as the 
history in general is divided in three periods (Antiquity, Middle Ages, Modern Times). A diagram that is not 
appropriate to the periods according to the spiritual tradition of the Islamic philosophy, whose real significance 
ng signs to characterize 
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 [10]. Therefore, not a periodisation brought from 
the history of philosophy and the 
history of  [10]. It is obvious that in this case the history of philosophy must be 
possible the complex game of transformations and of gaps which are modeling the appearance of the historical 
 [4].   
4. The problem of the philosophical meaning of the history of philosophy, between the skepticism towards 
a variable history and the dogmatism of the unique unhistorical truth 
  [11]. It is a reflected subjectivity because it corresponds 
to the subjectivity that is reflection, implying both that of the historian of philosophy, as the first reader whose 
comprehensive historical lecture is at the same time an interpretative historical writing, but also the reflection of 
the reader of the history of philosophy, whose reading is not properly speaking secondary, but involved in the 
hermeneutical task of comprehension. Both historian and reader are, in a way, placed in a presupposition that is 
not a dogmatic prejudgment, but their existential situation, because they are historical beings, meaning that they 
live in a history to which they are related personally. Every exegesis is accomplished by presupposition since it 
can only be historical and personal. The philosophical texts are speaking, but they are doing it through the 
f the 
 and not an exegesis inspired by the dogmatic 
text says, but makes it say  [12]. The interpreted philosophical texts are the very objectivity 
the history 
of philosophy only as a succession of doctrines understands only the continuity of a closed evolution, an 
interrupted development from causes to effects. This is the position of an abstract and exterior method of 
understanding the history of philosophy.  
An authentic existential interpretation needs to destruct this scholastic historiography, renewing its premises 
on the level of historical comprehension. Causal train of doctrines and systems implies also a hermeneutical train, 
seen on both sides, that is from the histor  points of view. It is a perspective that is 
operating with the significance of active factors which bind together doctrines that seem isolated at first sight. 
The textual philosophical phenomenon is questioned regarding its multiple significant valences, which are as 
many presuppositions of understanding the relations they keep with other philosophical phenomena, even in an 
interdisciplinary context (e. g. an interpretation of the medieval mystical currents understood from the point of 
view of their influence on the history of art). That is a research in which the historian is involved with his entire 
existential position. So that historical comprehension must make philosophical historiography human, and that is 
n the interpreter and the matter expressed (directly or indirectly) in 
 [12], a vital relation between the historian and the matter spoken about. The existential meeting that 
nent dialogue with living texts 
interpreted from inside. This inner enlightenment is in fact the hermeneutical horizon of the questioning, the 
re 
are responding only to those who feel themselves personally concerned by the fact that they are questioning, for 
whom the problem raised by the questioned texts is their own problem. And that in 
a uch as he 
 [2]. It is a technical language, proper to the singularity of a certain historical theory, but a 
 [2].  It is 
 diagram subject  object does not function any 
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more, since the historical comprehension can be objective only in the engaged subjectivity of those for whom to 
understand means to understand themselves.                                                                
Seen from thi the history of 
philosophy does not reduce itself to an irrational ma  
history of philosophy is a work of philosophy as a  [11]. On one hand, confronted 
with the unity of truth, the history of philosophy cannot affirm rationally this unity, because there are no 
enunciable or declarative logos in its historical continuity. On the other hand, the horizon opened towards all the 
doctrines in their succession is not unitary; its aperture is fragmented in a  corresponding 
to each system apart. What is variable, in spite of filiations or even epigonic repetitions, is the history inside 
philosophy; we may say that the historian cannot bathe twice in the same river of philosophy; there is not only 
the unity of the horizon which splits aside, but also his own point of view according to an existential and 
historical comprehension, the choice he must assume in valorizing some elements to the detriment of others. 
s and from the parts to the unity. It is 
n and of 
 the 
Same and on the Other, on the One and on the Multiple. It is finally the very ambiguous status of humanity, for 
the history of philosophy is, in the last analysis, one of the privileged ways on which humanity fights for its unity 
 [11]. 
the history of philosophy is a philosophical activity. The philosopher is the one who, in 
order to philosophize, tries to understand himself through his historical memory; and it is an act of philosophy to 
make a history of philosoph  [11]. This means that, from a methodological and epistemological point of view, 
the history of philosophy being by its very nature related both to the general philosophy and to the general 
history, its ambivalent status determines the problem of what P. n 
 [11].  A paradoxical situation confronts us with two poles or two limit ideas of 
comprehension: philosophy as a system and philosophy as singularity. If in the first case we have the 
subo  system that overhangs all the diachronic sequences pierced through by a 
major defining Idea, in the second, isolated philosophy is no more than a moment of history, but enveloped in the 
whole history. In both models of truth, history is in fact denied: the triumph of a rational system leaves behind a 
supposes for the historian to annihilate himself in a foreign world, to give up his own historicity in favour of that 
 
5. Conclusion  
In order to avoid this situation that seems to have an impossible issue, the history of philosophy would rather 
be based on the open horizon of the communication between two intentionalities, on reciprocity and inter-
unilateral; history is this segment of inter-subjectivity in which reciprocity is impossible, because the men of the 
past are not present for me [...] As a historian, I shall address my questions t  [11]. 
And if it does not respond it means that it signifies neither in my personal comprehension and nor in that of the 
general comprehension of men of the present. Does this fact mean, for the history of philosophy, that questioning 
is intimately connected with signifying only in a historical comprehension? That is: I can read and understand 
way of access to the problems raised by the history of philosophy  [4]. No question may be put to 
an unhistorical fact, whose answer is not its own one, but that of all and of nobody; no significant answer 
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corresponds to a proposal of a universal meaning of the question, to a general and abstract question which is not 
put by anybody. The double character of every history is to be in the same time structural and factual, and the 
lligibility, it reveals what 
 [11].  
This is also a limit of the historical comprehension of the history of philosophy and in general of the 
philosophical dis  way of thinking historical tradition involved in the history of 
philosophy must be destructed in order to free the philosophical dialogue inside the historical context, on the 
level of a type of comprehension that assumes temporality as the condition of the possibility of historicity. In fact 
it supposes an internalization of the temporal relation in a positive sense, as an original determination of the 
comprehension. The comprehension of the history of philosophy is first of all a comprehension of time; it acts in 
the movement of time, rather in the  of times whose chaos is lightened not by a new over-ordering 
doctrine, but by the questioning of a historian who is relating himself to past philosophies as to living beings able 
ul restitution of past doctrines is sufficient in order to 
adapt them to present questions; because it would often be to efface the meaning of these questions for the profit 
of retrospective solutions questions we have to examine; but 
it prepared for this examination more and more precise methods, better an  [2].  
The h ility of questioning and of dis-
covering history wi  [13], questioning being itself characterized by historicity. 
 covering 
 he understands this task as a destruction (Destruktion) realized in the horizon of the 
questionable [13]. The sense of this word is a positive one, it means deconstruction and not destroying, implying 
at its end the moment of recuperation. For the tradition is covering the real meaning of the essence of philosophy, 
the historian of philosophy must deconstruct the traditional historiography  that is the historiography captive in 
 congealed structures and systems, in the closed order of a blind succession of mute doctrines  by a 
  the historian of philosophy often 
realizes that he must firstly forget 
of prefabricated names, the domain of a generalized philosophical ambiguity. Consequently, the first thing 
required to the historian is to undo, to deconstruct those historiographical categories in order to reconstruct the 
philoso  [4]. Questioning the living philosopheme means to make it able to 
larification of the task of a 
destruction of history of philosophy on the historiographical 
comprehension which questions the philosophical works of the past not according to a preconceived structural 
dimension, but to their eventful essence, that is by an interpellation of the significance covered and recovered by 
tradition, dis-covered only from the existential point of view.  
Passing through time, making resound in the present the answers of the past, this difficult task does not imply 
for the historian of philosophy a linear continuous route, but often, as we have mentioned, a transfer of the level 
of doctrines, the spiritual context of their origins, the influences they support and the modifications they accuse. 
For instance, proposing himself to define the different aspects of the transition from the medieval ways of 
of three divine attributes from t
investigation on the threshold of questions -
revolutionary? What categories of continuity and change still have heuristic valu  [14]. But these questions 
suppose a disjointed cont  often consists not in inventing new categories or 
new forms of thinking, but rather in a surprising way of employing the existent ones. A fertile historical 
comprehension, revealing  in the diversity of possible ways of the transition from anteriority to the changes 
operated in posterity  two main directions: the dialectic anticipation of a new theory by an older one and the 
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transplantation of the existent categori
situation, the dialectic anticipation of the theory developed by Jean-Luc Marion [15] by Schelling, concerning 
  [16]. As for the second situation, the transplantation or rather the melting of 
nsplantation of 
Jansenism.  
Finally, we must not forget the reader of the history of philosophy. What provokes his interest to keep reading 
such a study? If the historical exegesis is an implied existential one, going from the perspective opened by the 
eventful living essence of the philosophical works of the past, his comprehension shares  
[17]   
together the same history, inside a liberated, dis- ) and generous tradition that signifies in a 
 adds Lavelle  is indivisible: it is present entirely 
in each man; and he finds in him the same conflic  yone perceives 
only a part of tru  [17]. The history of philosophy implies a common work of the 
their comm
world of the past they regard as not only being present, but also regarding them deeply. In fact, they meet the real 
significance of the text in what A. ,
reflects the game between the visible and the invisible, the spoken and the unspoken of an epoch, because 
moment of history, the question 
 [4]. In the conclusive chapter of his study about the Rhenan mystic, A. de Libera 
 
questions as many as the fields of recurrence and of coherence betwee  [18].  It is at 
 of language, because words are tempting to be understood, to attract in a highly 
y, at the cross  
reaching now the shore of a sea without limits, the foot of a mountain with its top hidden in the clouds: all these 
metaphors are good, so great is the  [10]. Or A. Besançon introducing the reader 
seemed to me being full of wonderful things, of philosophical and theological splendors, as if the problem of the 
divine image pulled them out by a thread and led the spectator from top to top on a prominent ridge path. I would 
like the reader to be captivated as much as me by the splendor of the la  [19]. It 
should be the undeclared hope of every historian of philosophy.                                                                         
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